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as to the defendant's financial condition which might have influenced the plaintiff's action, had he known of it, is no ground for equitable remedy. The second cause for avoiding the agreement is where the mistake is inconsistent with good faith, and proceeds from the violation of obligations imposed by law upon the conscience of either party. *Story's Eq. Jur.*, No. 151; *Wood v. Boynton*, 64 Wis. 625; *Thompson v. Jackson*, 3 Rand. 504.

COMMERCE—INTERSTATE COMMERCE.—*ST. & S. F. R. CO. v. STATE*, 113 S. W. 203 (ARK.).—*Held*, a continuous transportation of freight between points within a state is "interstate commerce," free from the interference of the state, where a part of the route is outside of the state because of the unsafe condition of a bridge forming a part of the line of road in the state between such points.

The general rule is that all transportation of freight and passengers from one state to another, or through more than one state, either by land or water, is interstate commerce. *Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois*, 118 U. S. 557; *Fry v. State*, 63 Ind. 562. The United States Supreme Court holds, that the transportation of freight or passengers from one point to another in the same state, either by land or water, where part of the route is outside of the state, is interstate commerce and not under the control of the state wherein it begins and ends. *Lord v. Steamboat Co.*, 102 U. S. 541. Some states, however, hold that such transportation is not interstate commerce. *Campbell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.*, 86 Ia. 587; *State v. W. U. Tel. Co.*, 113 N. C. 213; *Seawell v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co.*, 119 Mo. 222. In *State v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co.*, 40 Minn. 267, a distinction was made between a railroad line which is operated, partly through another state, for transportation between points in one state, and one which carries on the ordinary business of a common carrier along the line passing through the other state. The right of a state, to tax a railroad running between two points in the state, but partly over the territory of another state, was expressly distinguished from an attempt by the state directly to regulate such transportation while outside of its borders. *Lchigh Val. Ry. Co. v. Penn.*, 145 U. S. 192; *Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.*, 142 U. S. 217.

CRIMINAL LAW—HUSBAND AND WIFE—SLANDER OF WIFE BY HUSBAND.—*STATE v. FULTON*, 63 S. E. 145 (N. C.).—*Held*, that a husband may be convicted of slandering his wife, under a statute providing that if any person shall attempt in a wanton and malicious manner to destroy the reputation of an innocent woman by words, written or spoken, imputing unchastity, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Brown and Hoke, J. J., *dissenting*.

Slander was not a crime at common law, and it is only within comparatively recent times that statutes have been passed making certain slanderous charges indictable. *State v. Wakefield*, 8 Mo. App. 11. The most common of these statutory offenses is that of imputing a want of chastity to a female. *Stutts v. State*, 52 So. 51 (Fla.); *State v. Boos*, 66 Mo. App. 537. Only two cases of a slander of the wife by the husband, however, are to be found in the reports. One of these lays down the rule that such a statute is all-embracing and includes slander perpetrated by